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The Takings Clause and the Separation of 
Powers: An Essay 
The protection of private property lies at the very core of envi- 
ronmental law. After all, except on the high seas, just about all of 
the "environment" either is somebody's private property or lies 
just above it. Environmental regulation is, bluntly, the regulation 
of private property. The basic purpose of environmental laws is to 
help assure that private owners treat their property with appro- 
priate ecological respect. The reason we need environmental laws 
is that private owners are not always inclined to act in ways that 
respect our shared environment. 
The most fundamental environmental problem is this: across 
our nation there are literally hundreds of millions of acres of im- 
portant natural resource lands-farms, forests, wetlands, reser- 
voir watersheds, shore lands, endangered species habitat-lands 
that have relatively little commercial value in their present natu- 
ral condition, but which would have much greater commercial 
value if their natural values were degraded or destroyed. Stated 
differently, private property often will yield a much greater profit 
to  its owner if it is used in ways that will harm or obliterate im- 
portant environmental assets and values. For this reason, private 
owners are understandably tempted to supplant and eliminate the 
long-term natural values of their lands in order to carry out 
projects that will yield them the greatest returns in their own life- 
times. When faced with the grand trade-off between present grat- 
ification and future generations, a lot of people naturally favor 
themselves. 
Free markets are, in this context, almost inevitably driven to 
fail. This "market failure" is inevitable because people whose time 
horizons go out only a few decades determine the market valua- 
tions of future returns. Many people tend to have little interest in 
* John A. Humbach is a professor of law a t  Pace University Law School in 
White Plains, New York. 
This essay is based on remarks given a t  the Pace Environmental Law Review 
Symposium, March 28, 2003, Symposium Panel 1. 
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returns that will accrue long after the ends of their own lifetimes 
and, as a result, the market tends to value these more distant re- 
turns at  or near zer0.l The fertile, well-watered farm land of New 
Jersey, for example, may be capable of pushing up crops to relieve 
human hunger for the next 5000 years, as much of the fertile land 
of India, Egypt, and China has already done. But this long-term 
potential is of little practical concern to the farmer who wants to 
do the best he can for himself and his family during his own life- 
time. Such a farmer may, therefore, be understandably tempted 
to  sell the land to a developer who will pave it over and destroy its 
biological productivity forever. Because the dazzle of near-term 
gain can blind people to slower but perpetual potentials, untold 
future natural productivity is jeopardized by the operation of nor- 
mal market forces. The face of the earth and fate of our national 
land is being irrevocably shaped by the market forces of our 
generation. 
Now, overall, there are really only two practical policy 
choices: either we adopt environmental laws that will protect and 
defend our nation's one and only national land base from short- 
sighted modifications and poorly planned development, or we can 
surrender the fate of our national land, and the quality of our de- 
scendants' lives, to  the self-oriented decisions of a relative few- 
the tiny percentage of the American population that happens to 
own the lion's share of the nation's undeveloped land. That is it: 
either adopt comprehensive environmental laws regulating and 
restricting the ways in which people can modify the uses of private 
property-especially ecological assets-or cross our fingers, say a 
prayer, and hope that the self-interest and self-oriented motiva- 
tions of the relative handful of large land owners, in our genera- 
tion, will produce good results for all of future time. 
I want to stress that most property owners do not pose a de- 
velopment threat to  long-term environmental values. That is be- 
cause most owners of real property are content with the uses to 
which their property is already being put; in any event, they can- 
not legally change the use. That is to say, most American land- 
owners hold small parcels of land located in cities and suburbs, 
places where ordinary zoning regulations have long made it un- 
lawful to put land to a different use just because there would be a 
1. For example, using a 3% inflation-adjusted (or "real") interest rate, the pre- 
sent value of a $1000 return to be received in the year 2150 would be about $12. 
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profit to  be made in doing so.2 For most of this vast preponder- 
ance of American landholders-ordinary homeowners and propri- 
etors of small businesses-their property has already been 
developed to more or  less the maximum extent permissible under 
the zoning laws. A homeowner might find that he or she could 
double, quadruple, or increase tenfold the value of his or her prop- 
erty by converting it from a residence to a commercial storefront, a 
doctor's office, or a welding shop, but under ordinary zoning laws 
this normally cannot be done. Most people would probably agree, 
moreover, that such changes should not be done because they 
would be profoundly undesirable. That is why zoning laws are 
widely popular. 
As applied in cities and developed suburbs, the net effect of 
the ordinary zoning laws essentially amounts to  "existing use zon- 
ing."3 That is, in most cities virtually all of the land base is zoned 
to remain in the uses that already exist. Under such a regulatory 
regime, individuals may lose the chance to  score a profit by inten- 
sifying the use of their land, but the prohibition on their doing so 
is generally accepted. The fundamental goal is the protection of 
the interests of others. It is recognized that each person's "pri- 
vate" property is part of the "environment" of everybody else, and 
the private use of privately owned land is not a totally private 
affair. 
By contrast, the situation is entirely different for the smallish 
group of people who hold the vast bulk of the American land base, 
including most of the undeveloped and environmentally vulnera- 
ble lands of our nation. The owners of most of these lands never 
have been legally restricted to  the lands' "existing" uses in the 
way that is normal for most American owners (those owning land 
in cities). What is more, the owners of environmentally sensitive 
lands typically have no expectation that they even ought to be re- 
stricted in the land-use choices they make. On the contrary, de- 
- - - 
2. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926), is the landmark 
case upholding the constitutionality of traditional zoning regulations. See also Gorieb 
v. Fox, 274 U.S. 603, 608 (1927) (upholding set-back restrictions and stating that 
"zoning laws prescribing . . . the height of buildings . . . and the extent of the area to be 
left open for light and air . . . are, in their general scope, valid under the federal 
Constitution."). See generally DANIEL R. MANDELKER, LAND USE LAW 55 4-1 to 4-40 
(5th ed. 2003). 
3. For a more detailed explanation of "existing use zoning," see my earlier article 
Law and a New Land Ethic, 74 MINN. L. REV. 339 (1989). For further information 
and a model of an "existing-use zoning" ordinance, see also http://www.law.pace.edu/ 
jhumbach/publications~online.htm (last visited Sept. 26, 2003). 
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spite the fact that their choices can affect not only themselves but 
also the quality of life of all Americans, present and future, the 
expectations expressed by larger-tract owners are often exactly 
the opposite-that "nobody" has any business telling them what to 
do with their land (and our nation's environment). Hence, the bat- 
tles over private property rights. 
Now we could, of course, decide that private property rights 
ought to be protected as a paramount point of policy, much the 
way we accord protection to free speech, choice of religion, and 
other such guarantees in the Bill of Rights. If we did so, however, 
we would essentially be leaving the future of America's undevel- 
oped lands and natural resources to the relative handful of people 
who happen to own them in our generation. We have not, how- 
ever, decided to give such primacy to private property. On the 
contrary, the very reason our environmental protection laws have 
been enacted is that our nation has decided (if somewhat half- 
heartedly) not to leave our nation's land-resource future to a rela- 
tive handful of persons. Instead, the enactment of our environ- 
mental laws expresses our nation's decision that all Americans 
have a legitimate voice in the future of American land, the na- 
tional land base on which we all depend and which our descend- 
ants all must share. 
America is a republic-literally, a "thing of the people." What 
this means is that our country's destiny belongs, first and fore- 
most, to the people as a whole, not to a narrow class of larger-scale 
landowners-as it was in eighteenth century England, against 
which we fought a Revolution to  escape. America's future and 
that of the American land belongs to  the whole people, and our 
body of environmental laws represents our nation's democracy- 
driven choice that some uses of private land are simply too socially 
intolerable to allow. 
Unfortunately, however, one of the constants of post-Medieval 
history is that the large-landowner classes have never much cared 
for democracy-driven choices. The present situation in the United 
States is no different. Today it is expressed in the form of land- 
owner antipathy towards environmental laws. When environ- 
mental laws have real bite-depriving owners of near-term 
bonanzas they might otherwise reap-the owners are inclined to 
resist. In recent years, this resistance has taken the form of land- 
owner demands for "compensation." When a law deprives an 
owner of the ability to profit by changing the use of private land, 
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the argument goes, the taxpayers should pay compensation for the 
opportunity (value) lost. 
Before looking at the legal terms of this argument, we should 
consider the moral context. Basically, landowners' claims for 
"compensation" seem to be based on the idea that we have two 
kinds of laws in this country. First, there are the laws that people 
are supposed to obey. Obedience is expected even though a person 
might have to pass up certain private advantages that might oth- 
erwise accrue. Then (some seem to assume) there is a second kind 
of laws, the ones that people should not have to obey unless they 
get paid for the inconvenience of doing so. Laws prohibiting the 
degradation or destruction of important ecological resources fall 
into this second category. When holders of large undeveloped 
tracts find it inconvenient or burdensome to comply with these 
laws, they claim they are entitled to "just compensation," payment 
from the taxpayers for the burden of obeying the law. 
Fundamentally, the reason we have laws at all is because 
some behavior is simply too socially intolerable to allow. It may be 
robbing banks or filling wetlands, or whatever, but the common 
feature of the behavior prohibited by law is that it cannot be so- 
cially tolerated. Now ordinarily, when people engage in socially 
intolerable behavior, it is not a defense that the behavior is profit- 
able. For example, when customs agents seize a shipment of co- 
caine belonging to  a drug dealer, no one thinks the dealer should 
receive compensation because the government has taken his "pri- 
vate property" and his chance to  make a profit. The laws that pro- 
hibit drug trafficking are examples of the first kind of law that I 
mentioned earlier-the ones people are supposed to obey: import- 
ing cocaine is simply too socially intolerable to allow, period. 
And so it is with a wide range of laws. For example, in the 
land-use area, a person may wish to  utilize property as a house of 
ill-fame, as a child porn shop, or as a garden for raising mari- 
juana-or for any of a number of socially intolerable uses. Nobody 
suggests, however, that people are entitled to be paid compensa- 
tion for the profits they forgo in not making such uses. What is 
different about laws that forbid construction on tidal wetlands, 
that prohibit destruction of valuable farmland, or that prevent the 
extermination of whole species through the destruction of habitat? 
What is different about laws that forbid developments that will 
contaminate valuable drinking water reservoirs or pollute the air 
we all breathe? There does seem to be a difference, in the minds of 
a t  least some. For these kinds of laws-environmental protection 
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laws-seem to fall into the second category. People seriously con- 
tend that, if the government wants to prevent these socially intol- 
erable actions, it must be ready to pay "just compensation" for the 
lost profits that such actions could have produced. 
What we are seeing here, of course, is pure and simple selec- 
tive morality. The alleged constitutional basis for this selective 
morality is the so-called "takings clause" found in the Fifth 
Amendment of the United States Con~titution.~ On first reading, 
it may not be easy to see how the clause could serve as a basis for 
claiming compensation for obeying the law. What the takings 
clause says is: "[Nlor shall private property be taken for public use 
without just compensation."5 
For present purposes, the key word is "taken." By using the 
word "taken," the clause seems to refer most obviously to situa- 
tions in which the government makes direct physical appropria- 
tions of property, i.e., when it "takes" the land (or other property) 
away.6 That is, moreover, pretty clearly what the Framers of the 
Constitution had in mind.7 Indeed, for the first 130 years of the 
Republic, there was not much doubt that the takings clause only 
actually applied to direct takings of private p r ~ p e r t y . ~  
For most of the twentieth century, however, the takings 
clause has led very much of a dual existence-constituting a 
straightforward compensation requirement for cases of physical 
invasions of private property while also vaguely promising a possi- 
bility of compensation, under ill-defined circumstances, when the 
government affects property values by reg~la t ion .~  Broadly 
speaking, so-called regulatory takings refer to takings of private 
4. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
5. Id. 
6. The text of the Fifth Amendment itself provides a basis for drawing a 
distinction between physical takings and regulatory takings. Its plain 
language requires the payment of compensation whenever the govern- 
ment acquires private property for a public purpose. . . . But the Consti- 
tution contains no comparable reference to regulations that prohibit a 
property owner from making certain uses of her private property. 
Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-22 
(2002) (emphasis added). 
7. See William Michael Treanor, The Origins and Original Significance of the 
Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, 94 YALE L.J. 694, 711 (1985). 
8. At the time of Mugler u. Kansas, the Supreme Court went to pains to insist 
that, for the takings clause to apply, there must be a "physical invasion of the real 
estate of the private owner, and a practical ouster of his possession." Mugler v. Kan- 
sas, 123 U.S. 623,668 (1887) (quoting Trans. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635,642 (1878)). 
The Mugler case is discussed infra text accompanying notes 41-59. 
9. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. a t  321-22. 
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property interests by governmental actions that do not involve any 
physical invasion or impingement. Within this broad conception, 
however, the task of defining when a regulatory action actually 
becomes a compensable taking has proved elusive. After more 
than 100 years of interpretive effort,lO there has been no real pro- 
gress in formulating a coherent, principled, and widely accepted 
basis for the "regulatory takings" concept. Thus, in the dual exis- 
tence led by the takings clause, permanent physical takings are 
virtually always compensablel1 while so-called regulatory takings 
virtually never are. 
Fundamentally, the reason for this discrepant treatment is 
that so-called "regulatory takings" are ZI specious category. In- 
deed, I think it does not go too far to say that the conception of 
regulatory takings has no underlying "principle" at all, except a 
veiled skepticism about democratic government. The skepticism 
is not entirely irrational. Wealthier landowners recognize that 
those with little to lose may be all too willing to support property 
restrictions at  the expense of those who may lose a lot. 
Now there is nothing wrong with a healthy skepticism about 
government, but it is hard to see how the solution to the problem 
of over-regulation is to require the government to "regulate by 
purchase."12 While it is true that making the government pay a 
"price" to  enact regulation would cut down on over-regulation, it 
must be recognized that such a price will not only deter bad laws 
but hinder the adoption of needed ones as well. 
At any rate, the fundamental reason for the discrepant treat- 
ment of physical and regulatory takings is that, in the final analy- 
sis, it is the government's job, its very role, to restrict behavior by 
regulation, and almost everything the government does is likely to 
have an effect on economic values. There is simply no way that 
the government could compensate for all the negative effects that 
its actions have on property values.l3 There must be limits.14 
10. It is probably fair to say that Mugler v. Kansas marks the beginning of the 
Supreme Court's active input into the regulatory takings interpretive controversy. 
The turning point came in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (19221, dis- 
cussed infra text accompanying notes 62-84. 
11. But cf. United States v. Caltex, 344 U.S. 149 (1952) (denying compensation for 
private terminal facilities which the United States Army deliberately destroyed to 
prevent them from falling into enemy hands). Such examples of "emergency" or the 
like all have ample special features that clearly predominate the physical-invasion 
aspects of the government's action. 
12. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). 
13. Indeed, in the case that first recognized the concept of a "regulatory taking," 
the Supreme Court wrote: "Government hardly could go on if to some extent values 
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One possible approach is to find such limits in the text of the 
takings clause itself, such as by recognizing a suitable limiting 
definition of the critical term "property." Such a limiting defini- 
tion might, for example, confine compensable "property" to some- 
thing on the order of Holfeldian "rights" but not Holfeldian 
"privileges."15 As I have shown in an earlier article, by carefully 
formulating two distinct conceptions (for convenience referred to  
as "rights" and "freedoms"), it is possible to provide an account of 
the Supreme Court's takings cases that neatly divides them along 
the same lines as they are in fact divided.16 
incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in 
the general law." Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922). What the Court 
did not explain is what countervailing principle would require the government to "reg- 
ulate by purchase" in those cases where only valuable uses of property happened to be 
uses that are too socially intolerable to allow. 
14. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. a t  323-24 (2002) ("Land-use regula- 
tions are ubiquitous and most of them impact property in  some tangential way. . . ."I 
15. See WESLEY NEWCOMB HOLFELD, FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL CONCEPTIONS 35-50 
(Cook ed. 1919), also found in 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). Briefly, Holfeld argued that i t  
was crucial to clear thinking to distinguish "rights" (meaning essentially the legal 
advantage of being able to enforce some duty held by one or more others) from "privi- 
leges" (meaning the freedom to do something untrammeled by any right of others to 
stop you, i.e., having a privilege means not being burdened by a duty). 
16. See my earlier article, A Unifying Theory for the Just-Compensation Cases: 
Takings, Regulation and  Public Use, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 243,251-76 (1982) bereinaf- 
ter Unifying Theory]. Compare, e.g., Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council and Keystone Bitu- 
minous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), with Lucas v. S.C. Coastal 
Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (2002) and  Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 
(1987). The critical, and potentially most controvertible move in the previous article 
was to treat a deprivation of freedom a s  a taking of "rights" when the freedom depri- 
vation is so extensive that i t  renders the right nugatory-the "functional equivalent" 
of a taking of the rights themselves. See Unifying Theory, supra, a t  273. The Su- 
preme Court later (in Lucas) repeated and endorsed this echo of Holmes' original con- 
ception, though i t  took a perhaps rather more generous view of "functional 
equivalent." Lucas, 505 U.S. a t  1014. 
The policy explanation that I gave for the rightslfreedoms dichotomy was largely 
the same as  that enunciated for the physical/regulatory distinction in Tahoe-Sierra 
Preservation Council, 535 U.S. at 323-24 ("Treating [ubiquitous land-use regulations] 
as  per se takings would transform government regulation into a luxury few govern- 
ments could afford [whereas] physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily iden- 
tified and usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.") 
The primary difference between the defined conceptual distinction described in 
Unifjing Theory as in "fact" dividing the cases and the one the Supreme Court osten- 
sibly adheres to is this: The Supreme Court treats a "mere" deprivation of "freedom" 
as  occasion for "complex factual assessments of the purpose and economic effects of 
government actions." Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S. a t  323 (quoting Yee v. Es- 
condido, 503 U.S. 519, 523 (1992)). According to an  historical survey done for Unify- 
ing Theory, however, a mere deprivation of "freedoms" in fact means that no 
compensable taking will be recognized. In other words, absent a finding that there 
was a freedom-deprivation amounting to a functional equivalent of a taking of 
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The regulatory takings cases do not, however, make any such 
conceptual distinction17 and they do not define, even roughly, 
what would fall within the ambit of "property immune from regu- 
lation." This somewhat striking omission convinces me that the 
real issue in the regulatory takings cases is not about property 
rights at  all.18 The real issue is about the allocation of govern- 
mental power, specifically, who should decide, so as to bind us all, 
what is and is not "too socially intolerable to allow"? It is a ques- 
tion, in other words, that goes to the very structure of government. 
When various interests in society disagree about issues of policy 
and values, who decides? In the environmental protection sphere, 
who decides which uses of land are, and are not, too unacceptable? 
When property owners invoke the takings clause in an effort to get 
a court to trump legislation, the implicit contention is inevitably 
that the ultimate governmental power to decide should reside not 
in the democratically elected legislatures but in the courts. 
That the real question is about the structure of government, 
not about "rights," is clearly enough shown by the conventional 
contexts in which regulatory takings cases arise. Almost invaria- 
bly the private litigant's primary technical request for relief is for 
the court to overturn the results of the democratic legislative pro- 
cess. The immediate object is to convince the court that it should 
not adhere to the policy choices made by the representatives of the 
people. 
The history of takings law also amply demonstrates that the 
essential question of regulatory takings is about the constitutional 
structure of government, not the content or extent of private 
rights. Indeed, the modern law of regulatory takings began not 
with the takings clause but elsewhere, especially in the Constitu- 
tion's due process clauses. 
The original due process clause is contained in the Fifth 
Amendment. It states, "no person shall . . . be deprived of life, 
liberty or property, without due process of law."19 The other due 
process clause (the one that operates as a constraint on the states) 
"rights," the Supreme Court has never required compensation to be paid for a mere 
regulation. 
17. Although one of them comes close. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, 535 U.S.  
a t  322-23. 
18. Obviously, property rights and the government's power to affect them are cen- 
tral, but not so much as the basis for resolving the question as for the motivation for 
raising it in the first place. The motivation is, of course, to protect (and, perhaps, 
amplify) private wealth embodied in private property rights. 
19. U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
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is in the Fourteenth Amendment, and it says essentially the same 
thing.20 The due process limitations on exercises of governmental 
power have, as we know, been conventionally divided into two 
broad categories, "procedural due process" and so-called "substan- 
tive due process." The basic idea of procedural due process is 
pretty intuitive: Before the government's agents or functionaries 
can deprive a person of property (or liberty or life) certain proce- 
dures-"processn-must first be observed. Procedural due process 
is, as the name implies, about "process." 
Substantive due process is also about "process," though per- 
haps in not quite so obvious a way. Whereas the primary concern 
of procedural due process is that the government's agents and 
functionaries follow all the requirements of extant "law" before de- 
priving people of property (or liberty, or life), the primary concern 
of substantive due process is that the law itself be validly created. 
The requirement of substantive due process is a corollary of the 
concept of limited government-a government of limited powers. 
As the Supreme Court has written: "There are, of necessity, limits 
beyond which legislation cannot rightfully go. [Tlhe courts must 
obey the Constitution rather than the law-making department of 
government, and must, upon their own responsibility, determine 
whether, in any particular case, these limits have been passed."21 
In other words, substantive due process is a kind of rule of ultra 
uires. The Constitution expressly imposes a number of limitations 
on the government's powers-for example, with respect to free ex- 
pression, freedom of the press, regulation of assembly, and the es- 
tablishment of religions. In addition to these express limitations 
on the government's power, the Supreme Court has also recog- 
nized that there are other limitations, implicit and more general, 
as well-such as the requirement that the governmental power be 
exercised in the public interest. In this regard, what is of particu- 
lar concern for the present discussion is a species of substantive 
due process, sometimes known as "economic due process." 
The legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public 
interests, arbitrarily interfere with private business, or impose 
unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon lawful occupations. 
In other words, its determination as to what is a proper exercise 
-- - - - - 
20. U.S. CONST. amend. X I V ,  5 1 (''[Nlor shall any State deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . ."). 
21. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 661 (1887). 
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of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the 
supervision of the 
Under the umbrella of "economic due process," the Supreme Court 
of an earlier time undertook to evaluate and selectively strike 
down a number of legislative enactments (including land-use reg- 
ulations)23 on the ground that the legislation was outside the leg- 
islature's power to enact. 
The primary "test" of economic process was stated succinctly 
in the case of Lawton v. Steele.24 At issue in Lawton was a statute 
that prohibited certain kinds of fishing nets and authorized gov- 
ernment agents to take and destroy the offending nets wherever 
found.25 The Court upheld the statute but in doing so spelled out 
the following test to be used by the courts in reviewing legislative 
acts: 
The interests of the public generally must require the 
interference; 
The means must be reasonably necessary to accomplish the 
public purpose; 
The means must be not unduly oppressive upon 
 individual^.^^ 
The doctrine of economic due process fell into disrepute during the 
New Deal era, after the Supreme Court struck down a number of 
measures that Congress had adopted to  alleviate the Great De- 
pression. By 1938, the Court itself had largely emasculated the 
doctrine. It did so by adopting, in United States v. Carolene Prod- 
ucts C O . , ~ ~  what has come to be known as the "rational basis" test: 
"[Rlegulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transac- 
tion is not to be pronounced unconstitutional unless . . . it is of 
such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon 
some rational basis. . . ."28 A statute "depriving" a person of prop- 
erty could be struck down on "economic due process" grounds only 
22. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894). 
23. Washington ex rel. Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge, 278 U.S. 116 (1928); 
Nectow v. Cambridge, 277 U.S. 183 (1928). 
24. 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
25. 152 U.S. a t  135. 
26. Id. a t  137. 
27. 304 U.S. 144 (1938). See also Carmichael v. S. Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 
508-09 (1937) (explaining that  there could be no constitutional challenge to economic 
legislation where the legislature acted rationally). 
28. Id. a t  152. 
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if it could be found to  have no rational basis-an almost insupera- 
ble test to  meet.29 
Meanwhile, a t  the same time that the jurisprudence of "eco- 
nomic due process" was evolving, there were also some interpre- 
tive developments concerning the takings clause itself, creating 
the foundation for what has become the doctrine of "regulatory 
takings." Remember, as I mentioned earlier, the original under- 
standing of the takings clause was that it applied only to physical 
takings of property. However, in an 1871 case, Pumpelly v. Green 
Bay Co.,30 the Supreme Court made a substantial inroad on that 
notion. The Pumpelly case was brought by a landowner against 
his downstream neighbor who had built a dam that caused water 
to back up, flooding the complainant's pr~per ty .~l  The defendant 
had built his dam under a license granted by the state, and he 
asserted that he therefore had a "right, under legislative author- 
ity, to build and continue the dam without legal responsibility for 
those injuries."32 The question thus became whether "the State 
had a right to inflict [the damages sustained by the plaintiff] with- 
out making any compensation for them."33 The takings clause 
was asserted as the basis for concluding that the state did not 
have such a right.34 
The linchpin of the defendant's argument was that "there is 
no taking of the land within the meaning of the constitutional pro- 
vision, and that the damage was a mere consequential result" of a 
legitimate governmental action, fostering the improvement of a 
29. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). A post-1938 case in which 
the Court seems to have struck down legislation a t  least partially on "substantive due 
process" grounds is Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499-500 (1977) 
(questioning whether limited definition of "family" in zoning regulations rationally 
furthers some legitimate state purpose). However, the opinions in Moore are deeply 
divided, and the interest injured by the legislation was as much a "family" interest as 
a property one. 
30. 80 U.S. 166 (1871). Actually, the Pumpelly case was decided under the tak- 
ings clause of the Wisconsin Constitution (now WIS. CONST. art. 1, 13). However, to 
simplify this brief history, that is a distinction which can be safely glided over since it 
seems to have had no enduring substantive impact. See Sinnickson v. Johnson, 17 
N.J.L. 129 (N.J. 1839). The main importance for the case itself was that, a t  the time, 
it was not yet thought that the takings clause in the Fifth Amendment applied to the 
states. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. a t  176-77. The "incorporationn of the takings clause so it 
applied against the states was to come later in Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. v. 
Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897). 
31. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. a t  177. 
32. Id. at 176. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. 
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navigable stream.35 If indeed there was no "taking" within the 
meaning of the Constitution, then the case would be governed by 
the essentially due process consideration of whether the public in- 
terest (in navigation) sufficiently justified any deprivations that 
the plaintiff sustained. The defendant argued, moreover, that this 
was not a case of a "taking" in the constitutional sense because 
"[tlhe defendant's lands have not been taken or appropriated. 
They are only affected. . . ."36 In other words, the plaintiff still 
had his land; it was just under some water. 
The Supreme Court disagreed with the defendant's conten- 
tion concerning the inapplicability of the takings clause. It de- 
clared instead "where real estate is actually invaded by super- 
induced additions of water, earth, sand, or other material, or by 
having any artificial structure placed on it, so as to effectually de- 
stroy or impair its usefulness, it is a taking, within the meaning of 
the Constitution. . . ."37 The destruction of private property is the 
equivalent of "taking" it for purposes of the taking c lau~e .3~  Be- 
cause there was no provision for just compensation in the dam- 
licensing statutes at issue in Pumpelly, they were void,39 and 
therefore provided no legal defen~e.~O 
The next great landmark in the regulatory-takings series was 
Mugler v. Kansas.41 Mugler was a commercial brewer in Kansas. 
In 1881, Kansas decided it would be a good idea to  outlaw beer. 
The state proceeded to  institute "prohibition" by adopting a consti- 
tutional amendment and implementing it by statute.42 For 
Mugler, this was a disaster. His brewery was "erected for the pur- 
pose of manufacturing beer, and cannot be put to any other 
use. . . ."43 His investment was left with "little value"44 or "no 
value."45 
35. Id. at 177 (emphasis in the original). 
36. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 174 (emphasis in the original). 
37. Id. a t  181 (emphasis added). 
38. See id. at 179 (stating, "a serious interruption to the common and necessary 
use of property may be . . . equivalent to the taking of it. . . ."). 
39. Id. a t  182. 
40. Id. a t  181. 
41. 123 U.S. 623 (1887). 
42. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 654-55. 
43. Id. at 654. 
44. Id .  
45. Id. a t  664. "[Olr, a t  least, will be materially diminished in value. . . ." Id. The 
Court did not seem to think it made a difference which of these resulting values was 
in fact the case. 
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Subsequently Mugler was indicted and convicted of manufac- 
turing and selling intoxicating beverages.46 In the United States 
Supreme Court, he sought to have the Kansas legislation declared 
void.47 AS his constitutional bases, he asserted both the takings 
clause and the due process clau~e.~S The takings-clause argument 
relied in part on Pumpelly v. Green Bay. Just as the owner in 
Pumpelly suffered a "taking" when his land had been flooded with 
water, so Mugler's brewery was flooded with regulation. Either 
way, the government's action would be subject to the "fundamen- 
tal maxim of all free governments," allegedly recognized in 
Pumpelly, "that whenever the necessities of the public require 
that the property of a citizen shall be taken or destroyed, compen- 
sation must be made for the 1 0 ~ s . " ~ ~  
The Supreme Court disagreed. It held that Mugler's case fell 
under the due process clause rather than under the takings 
clause.50 According to the Court, governmental impairments of 
land-use "not directly encroaching upon private property . . . do 
not constitute a taking within the meaning of the constitutional 
provision, or entitle the owner of such property to compensa- 
tion. . . ."51 Pumpelly was distinguished as involving a "physical 
invasion of the real estate [by the flooding], and a practical ouster 
of his posse~sion."5~ As for mere land-use regulations, the court 
said: "A prohibition simply upon the use of property for purposes 
that are declared, by valid legislation, to  be injurious to the 
health, morals, or safety of the community, cannot, in any just 
sense, be deemed a taking or an appropriation of property for the 
public benefit."53 
Mugler's due process contentions also failed. The Supreme 
Court rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment could 
be read to restrain the states' exercise of the "police powers" to 
protect public heath, safety, morals and welfare,S4 or to  decide 
what is necessary for that purpose.55 "[A111 property in this coun- 
- - - 
46. Id.  at 653. 
47. Mulger, 123 U.S. at 653. 
48. Id. at 664. 
49. Mulger v. Kansas, 1887 U.S. LEXIS 2204 (Dec. 5, 1887) (statements of Mr. 
George G. Vest, counsel for plaintiff in error). 
50. Mugler, 123 U.S. at  668. 
51. Id.  at 668. 
52. Id. (quoting Trans. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878)). 
53. Id. at 668-69. 
54. Id. at 664, 669. 
55. Nor can legislation (prohibiting uses declared "injurious to the health, morals, 
or safety") come within the Fourteenth Amendment, in any case, unless it is apparent 
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try is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it 
shall not be injurious to  the community."56 
But who decides, so as to bind us all, what is and is not "inju- 
rious to  the community"? That was the pivotal question in the 
case-not whether beer is too socially intolerable to allow, but who 
decides whether it is. "[Flor this purpose," the Court quoted, "the 
largest legislative discretion is allowed," adding "the discretion 
cannot be parted with any more than the [police] power itself."57 
It is up to  the legislature and not to the courts to decide what is, 
and is not, too socially intolerable to allow. 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court in Mugler did not make a de- 
cision about the content or extent of Mugler's property rights, or 
whether the legislature had good cause to ban beer, but rather 
about the structure of government. As times change, and as 
knowledge, needs, and values evolve with the times, the "govern- 
mental power" must reside somewhere to protect and advance the 
public interest "as the special exigencies of the moment may re- 
quire. . . ."58 Under our constitutional structure the governmental 
power to keep the laws up-to-date resides in the democratically 
elected legislature, not in the courts.59 
With the annual volume of legislation, one hardly has to be 
reminded how changing conditions can require changes in the law. 
Examples of policy reversal abound. A hundred or so years ago, at 
the time of Mugler, beer was too socially intolerable to allow (in 
Kansas) and margarine was too socially intolerable to  allow (in 
Pennsy1vania)GO while, at roughly the same time, Coca Cola con- 
tained cocaine.G1 The "noxious" swamps and bogs of yesteryear 
are the valued wetlands of today. Beaches and riverbanks, once 
thought to be ideal places to build a house, are now viewed, in the 
light of some expensive disasters, in a very different way. What is 
"too socially intolerable to  allow7'? It depends. Not so long ago it 
was beer and margarine but not opiates while today it is exactly 
the opposite. If the laws are to be kept in harmony with the times, 
somebody has to decide what changes the public interest re- 
that its real object is not, to protect the community, or to promote the general well- 
being, but, under the guise of police regulation, to deprive the owner of his liberty and 
property, without due process of law. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 669. 
56. Id. at 665. 
57. Id. a t  669 (citations omitted). 
58. Id. 
59. Id.  at 669. 
60. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678 (1888). 
61. See United States v. Housley, 751 F. Supp. 1446, 1447 (D. Nev. 1990). 
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quires-and, hence, the crucial question of our constitutional 
structure: "Who decides?" When litigants and courts invoke the 
takings clause and "property rights" to overturn determinations 
by the elected legislature, the point is to transfer that ultimate 
decision-making power from the legislature to the courts. 
It was precisely such a removal of power from the legislature 
that occurred in the third landmark case in this series: Penn- 
sylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.G2 As the reader probably knows very 
well, Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon was the first case in which the 
Supreme Court recognized that there could be such a thing as a 
regulatory taking. The case is well-known, and I will not discuss 
it at length, but I want to note two things: First (and this often 
passes notice), Pennsylvania Coal was not actually decided under 
the takings clause but under the due process clause-as essen- 
tially a case of economic due process. The rationale for the actual 
decision in the case was that the Pennsylvania statute failed all 
three elements of the Lawton v. Steele test, quoted above? 
1) The interests of the public generally did not require the in- 
terference with the coal company's right to mine coal out 
from under people's houses: 
"This is the case of a single private house. . . . But usually 
in ordinary private affairs the public interest does not war- 
rant much of this kind of interference. A source of damage 
to such a house is not a public nuisance. . . . The extent of 
the public interest is shown by the statute to be 
limited. . . ."64 
2) The means were not reasonably necessary for the accom- 
plishment of the purpose: 
"Furthermore, it is not justified as  a protection of personal 
safety. That could be provided for by notice.n65 
3) The means were unduly o p p r e s s i ~ e : ~ ~  
"[The statute] purports to abolish what is recognized in 
Pennsylvania as an estate in land-a very valuable estate- 
62. 260 U.S. 393 (1922). For any who may possibly be unaware, the issue in 
Pennsylvania Coal was the validity of a state statute that prohibited the mining of 
"certain coal"-specifically that which lay beneath homes, streets, and various other 
surface improvements. The statute's object was to prevent the disastrous subsidence 
that could occur in the aftermath of undermining, which deprives surfaces structures 
of vertical support. 
63. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
64. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. a t  413-14. 
65. Id. a t  414. 
66. Id. 
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and what is declared by the Court below to be a contract 
hitherto binding the  plaintiff^."^^ 
Therefore, the Pennsylvania Coal opinion concludes: "[Wle 
should think it clear that the statute does not disclose a public 
interest sufftcient to warrant so extensive a destruction of the de- 
fendant's constitutionally protected rights."@ The analysis so far 
is pure "economic due process" judicial "supervision"69 of the legis- 
lature, and it was enough to decide the case. 
The second thing I want to mention about the Pennsylvania 
Coal decision is that, contrary to its general reputation, it can not 
be fairly regarded as a landmark for the protection of private 
property rights. Rather, what the case did, merely, was accord 
constitutional protection to one group of property owners at  the 
expense of another group of property owners-specifically, it pro- 
tected the interests of the big coal companies at  the expense of 
ordinary homeowners. Therefore, as a charter for the protection 
of private property rights, the Pennsylvania Coal case was decid- 
edly wanting when it comes to the most important item of private 
property that most Americans 
At any rate, after deciding that the interests of American 
homeowners were not of sufficient public concern to justify inter- 
ference with great industrial interests, the Pennsylvania Coal de- 
cision went on to lay out, famously, what the Supreme Court has 
later called an "advisory opinionn71 on the takings clause. It was 
in this portion of the opinion that Justice Holmes penned the fa- 
mous lines: "To make it commercially impracticable to mine cer- 
tain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional 
purposes as appropriating or destroying it,"72 and "while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking."73 
67. Id. 
68. Id. (emphasis added). 
69. See Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1895) ([The legislature's] determina- 
tion as to what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is 
subject to the supervision of the courts."). Accord Mugler, 123 U.S. at 664. 
70. It is a bit ironic that the Pennsylvania Coal case is so frequently touted by 
property-rights advocates as the supreme protector of private property when, in fact, 
the case specifically held that there was not much public interest in protecting the 
kind of private property that, for most people, is their single most important and valu- 
able asset, their homes. 
71. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 484 (1987). 
72. Pa. Coal Co., 260 U.S. a t  414. 
73. Id. at 415. 
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While the Pennsylvania Coal opinion did not say how far is 
"too far," it did make clear that a mere regulation of use could 
effectuate a taking-by going "too far." Hence, the birth of "regu- 
latory takings." 
Another forty years went by in which the Supreme Court did 
not explain how far is "too far." By the early 1980s, however, two 
different formulations for deciding "takings" cases were being re- 
peated by the Supreme Court in regulatory cases. For conve- 
nience, I will refer to these as the "three-part test" and the "two- 
part test."74 They may be summarized as follows: 
Three-part test (Penn Central)-factors having "particular 
significance": 
Economic impact; 
Extent of interference with reasonable investment- 
backed expectations; 
"Character" of the i n t e r f e r e n ~ e . ~ ~  
Two-part test (Agins u. City of Tiburon). A taking occurs if a 
regulation: 
Does not substantially advance a legitimate state inter- 
est, or 
Deprives the owner of economically viable use of the 
land.76 
The three-part test originated in the case of Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York C i t ~ . 7 ~  The Court denied that 
there was any "set formula" for deciding takings casesY78 but it 
described the three factors in the test as having "particular signif- 
i ~ a n c e . " ~ ~  Apparently the three factors were to be looked at to- 
gether, a kind of seat-of-the-pants weighing of non-comparables. 
. 74. See my extensive treatment of these two formulations in my earlier article, 
Economic Due Process and the Takings Clause, 4 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 411 (1987) 
[hereinafter Economic Due Process]. 
75. By "character" the Court meant whether the government's interference with 
private property constitutes a physical intrusion, or whether it was a mere adjust- 
ment of the burdens and benefits of living together in a civilized society, in other 
words, a regulation. Pem. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978). But cf. Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 717 n.2,718 (1987) (treating "character" 
factor as looking to whether the government's action was "extraordinary" in going 
beyond what was "appropriate" to achieve the government's valid objectives): 
76. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). 
77. 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978). 
78. Id. a t  124. 
79. Id. 
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Meanwhile, the Court was also framing its "takings" ratio- 
nales in terms of a different test, the two-part test. The general 
conceptual elements of the two-part test were also mentioned in 
Penn Central,80 but the test's canonical formulation came a couple 
of years later in Agins v. City of Tiburon, viz., land-use regulation 
can effect a taking if it does not "substantially advance legitimate 
state interests, . . . or it denies an owner economically .viable use of 
his land. . . ."a1 If either part of the two-part test applies to a regu- 
lation on land use, the regulation will be a taking. 
The Supreme Court employed the two-part test and the three- 
part test more or less simultaneously for a number of years but, 
curiously, it rarely referred to both in the same case.82 Maybe it 
was simply that some of the justices felt more comfortable with 
the amorphous "no set formula" three-part analysis, while others 
liked the more structured discretion of the two-part test. 
The case of Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council83 repre- 
sented a kind of apogee for the two-part test.s4 In Lucas, an owner 
of beachfront lots claimed a right to compensation for a taking af- 
ter a state agency designated his lots as effectively non-buildable 
under the South Carolina's Beachfront Management Act.85 JUS- 
tice Scalia wrote the opinion of the Court, which held that the 
owner was entitled to compensation.86 In doing so, the Court re- 
garded the key distinction to be whether the complaining owner's 
land had other valuable uses in addition to the ones deemed by 
the legislature to be too anti-social to allow. As long as such other 
valuable uses exist, the legislature has the power to prohibit 
80. Id. a t  127. 
81. Agins, 447 U.S. a t  260 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
82. See Economic Due Process, supra note 74, at 417-45. 
83. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
84. Although the opinion mentions the factors of the three-part test in a footnote, 
and states they are "keenly relevant to takings analysis generally," Lucas, 505 U.S. a t  
1019 n.8, the majority opinion essentially ignores the constitutional force of the fac- 
tors as such. In particular, as Justice Kennedy pointed out in his concurring opinion, 
"The finding of 'no value' should have been considered under the Takings Clause by 
reference to the owner's reasonable, investment-backed expectations. . . . Where a 
taking is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all value, the test 
must be whether the deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment-backed expec- 
tations." 505 U.S. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring). The continued importance of the 
three-part test, especially the "investment-backed expectationsn factor was decisively 
reinforced ten years later in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional 
Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 321-32 & 336 (2002). See also Palazzolo v. Rhode 
Island, 533 U.S. 606, 608 (2001). 
85. Lucas, 505 U.S. a t  1008-09. 
86. Id. at 1026-32. 
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harmful uses. As Justice Scalia wrote: I t  is "a reality we nowa- 
days acknowledge explicitly with respect to the full scope of the 
State's police power" that "government may, consistent with the 
Takings Clause, affect property values by regulation without in- 
curring an obligation to compensate. . . ."87 If such other valuable 
uses are absent, however, then the legislature may not prohibit 
the anti-social uses (the only "valuable" uses) by ordinary regula- 
tion-it must "regulate by purchase."88 Under the second prong of 
the two-part test, compensation is required if a government action 
deprives land of "all economically beneficial uses. . . ."89 
I will say a few things about the larger significance of the Lu- 
cas case in a moment, but first I want to focus attention on a curi- 
ous thing about the two-part test of takings, namely, the fact that 
this test looks like a resurrection, with a bit of linguistic tweaking, 
of the old "economic due process" doctrine as formulated in Law- 
ton v. Steele. To see this more clearly, observe first that the ele- 
ments of the two-part test are actually three in number, and they 
correspond almost exactly to the three elements of economic due 
process that were a hundred years ago announced in Lawton v. 
Steele.90 Here is a table of the counterparts: 
"Legitimate state interest" ++ "needs of the public require the 
interference" 
"Substantially advances" - "means reasonably necessary to ac- 
complish the public purpose" 
"Does not deny economically viable use" - "not unduly oppres- 
sive on individuals" 
Actually it should be no surprise that the two-part test looks so 
much like the old economic due process test. When the two-part 
test first emerged (originally in Penn Central, and then in Agins), 
the Supreme Court cited "economic due process" cases as prece- 
dents.91 Thus, both analytically as well as historically it looks 
- -  - -  
87. Id. a t  1023. 
88. Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 65 (1979). 
89. Lucas, 505 U.S. at  1019 (emphasis in original). 
90. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
91. The Penn Central opinion, 438 U.S. at 125, cited Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 
277 U.S. 183, 188-89 (1928), which was plainly decided on the basis of economic due 
process analysis: "[Tlhe invasion of the property . . . was serious and highly injurious 
. . . and, since a necessary basis for the support of that invasion is wanting, the action 
of the zoning authorities comes within the ban of the Fourteenth Amendment and 
cannot be sustained." See Agins u. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980) (also 
citing Nectow). The Penn Central opinion, 438 U.S. at 126-27, also cited Goldblatt u. 
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very much as though the two-part test for takings has become a 
kind of placeholder for the old doctrines of economic due process 
that the Supreme Court nominally abandoned over sixty years 
ago. Through the application of the two-part test of "taking," the 
basic ideology of economic due process breathes new life. 
And what is the basic ideology of economic due process? Pri- 
marily, it is the idea that the validity of legislative acts is to be 
tested by the courts against the three kinds of policy considera- 
tions set out in Lawton v. Steele-public need, suitability of 
means, and impact on private interests.92 It is the legal principle 
that "judicial reviewn-judicial "~upervision"~3 of legislative deci- 
sion making-extends to reconsidering the crucial policy choices 
as to what is and is not too socially intolerable to allow, viz., 
whether the public interest requires government interference ("le- 
gitimate state interest"), whether the legislature's chosen means 
to an end are reasonably necessary ("substantially advances"), 
and whether the means are unduly oppressive ("denies economi- 
cally viable use"). In other words, the basic ideology of economic 
due process is that the constitutional structure of government- 
specifically, the division of power between the legislature and the 
judiciary-gives courts the power to second-guess elected legisla- 
tures on the "wisdom" of economic legislation. 
Thus, by way of the two-part test of takings, the Supreme 
Court in Lucas has effectively reclaimed some of the ground that 
it relinquished when, in the late 1930s, it announced that federal 
courts would henceforth apply a "rational basis" test in deciding 
due process challenges to the constitutionality of economic legisla- 
tion.94 Although, after Lucas, the "rational basis" test may still 
apply to  cases where the land in question also has valuable non- 
prohibited uses,g5 Lucas made clear that it does not apply in those 
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962), which in turn was based on the economic 
due process landmark, Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). 
92. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
93. See Lawton, 152 U.S. at  137 ("[The legislature's] determination as to what is a 
proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is subject to the 
supervision of the courts."). Accord Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 664 (1837). 
94. See supra text accompanying note 27. 
95. An intriguing open question is whether the first prong of the two-part test of 
takings is to be treated as a serious constraint on legislative actions, i.e., whether 
there is to be strict scrutiny on the questions of whether challenged legislation indeed 
responds to a "legitimate state interestn and whether it "substantially advance[sIn 
that interest. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260. At the very least, the Lucas opinion evi- 
dences deep skepticism about relying on legislative recitations of justifications in ap- 
plying these tests-saying that since such justifications "can be formulated in 
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situations where the legislature has identified and prohibited 
harms that are inseparable from the only "economically benefi- 
cial" uses that the land happens to have.96 In this latter kind of 
case, according to Lucas, legislated prohibitions designed to pre- 
vent harms (such as destroying ecological values for the sake of 
short-term gain) will be valid only if they "do no more than dupli- 
cate the result that could have been achieved in the 
courts. . . . "97-for example, under the law of nuisance.98 Thus, it 
is the courts, not elected legislatures, who are to have the last 
word on whether proscribed conduct is really and truly too socially 
intolerable to allow. 
Moreover, the Lucas Court made clear that the lower courts 
are not to use judicial review in takings cases as an occasion to 
expand upon the "result[sl that could have been achieved in the 
courts" in order to uphold legislative determinations-for example 
by stretching the law of nuisance or otherwise devising novel 
"common-law" notions about what is too socially intolerable to al- 
low. On the contrary, the Court admonished that, in deciding 
"what existing state law permits," a legislated land-use regulation 
"may be defended only if an objectively reasonable application of 
relevant precedents would exclude those beneficial uses in the cir- 
cumstances in which the land is presently found."99 
It may be debated whether environmental protection laws 
were the Supreme Court majority's primary target here, but they 
were certainly among the most directly hit. It is precisely environ- 
mentally sensitive lands (such as ocean dunes and wetlands) that 
are among those most likely not to have any other "economically 
beneficial" uses if the right to strip them of their long-term natu- 
ral values is taken away. 
The Supreme Court predicted that its rule in Lucas would not 
hamstring legislatures except in "extraordinary circumstance[sl" 
or "relatively rare situations" because government regulation sel- 
dom has the effect of depriving a landowner of "all economically 
beneficial uses."100 That rosy prediction is, however, questiona- 
practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stupid 
staff." Lucas, 505 U.S. a t  1025 n.12. 
96. There is language in Lucas indicating that takings of all economically benefi- 
cial value would constitute a per se taking only when the property involved is land, as 
opposed to personal property. See Lucas, 505 U.S .  at 1027-28. 
97. Id. a t  1029. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. a t  1031 n.18. 
100. Id. a t  1017-18. 
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ble. No doubt the Court is correct that, no matter what (realistic) 
regulation is applied, it will rarely occur that affected land parcels 
will end up with literally no value-in the sense that there is no 
one in the market who would pay anything for it whatsoever. 
There will always probably be at least some speculative value101 
and, beyond that, also some residuum of marketable usefulness 
for which, at the right price, some buyer might be found.lO2 In the 
final analysis, then, whether "all value" takings are rare or not 
depends a great deal on how one is to understand the concept of 
"all economically beneficial uses." Will it mean what it says-that 
the land must be made literally devoid of market value (including 
speculative value)-or will there be some sort of de minimis quali- 
fication under which the courts are to  disregard low-value uses 
such as buffers, bird-watching, viewsheds, or the like? 
The factual context of Lucas supplies at least some basis for 
believing that minimal residual values will not prevent a compen- 
sable taking from occurring.1°3 In addition, the Court has said 
later (in dictum), "a State may not evade the duty to  compensate 
on the premise that the landowner is left with a token interest."l04 
At any rate, if the courts do disregard minimal residual values, we 
101. There are invariably speculators willing to gamble that even the most 
severe restrictions will eventually be lifted or modified so as to render the 
property usable again. If the existence of such a residual market for the 
property could defeat a claim for a regulatory taking, no regulatory tak- 
ing could ever be proved and the concept would be rendered meaningless. 
In fact, when courts have determined that property has been rendered 
unfit for economically viable activity, they have found a Fifth Amendment 
taking even though the property obviously continued to have market 
value. 
Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 8 C1. Ct. 160, 167 (1985). 
102. A major exception would be lands subject to environmental regulations that 
require their owners to make extensive expenditures-for the clean up of deposited 
toxics, for example. It is not at all far-fetched to think of a parcel of land whose maxi- 
mum potential-use value is far less than the legally required clean-up costs. This 
would constitute a pretty clear case of a government regulation that deprives an 
owner of "all economically beneficial use." An old authority for allowing such an elim- 
ination of "all economically beneficial use" is Moeschen u. Tenement House Dep't, 203 
U.S. 583 (19061, affg without opinion, 72 N.E. 231 (N.Y. 1904) (upholding require- 
ment that outdoor privies be replaced with indoor toilets even when the cost of re- 
placement exceeded the value of the premises, thus rendering them of negative 
value). 
103. Lucas, 505 U.S. a t  1009 n.2. The opinion pointed out that the state's law "did 
allow the construction of certain nonhabitable improvements, e.g., 'wooden walkways 
no larger in width than six feet,' and 'small wooden decks no larger than one hundred 
forty-four square feet[,]"' but these did not suffice to prevent the conclusion that the 
owner was entitled to compensation under the Constitution. Id. 
104. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 631 (2001) (emphasis added). 
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may find that ecologically vulnerable lands may present recurring 
occasions for courts to overturn legislative determinations to  pre- 
serve by regulation. Elected legislatures might determine that 
harms such as filling in (otherwise) low-market-value wetlands or 
destroying endangered-species habitat are too socially intolerable 
to  allow but, unlike the beer in Mulger, the margarine in Powell, 
or narcotic drugs today, state legislatures cannot prevent such 
harms by police power regulation. Only a court would have the 
power to treat these new kinds of mischief as "illegaln-by acting 
to extend the common law (e.g., of nuisance)-and the Lucas opin- 
ion, as already mentioned, would take a dim view of even that.105 
More broadly, given the reality that many environmental assets 
may have little or no value as market (economic) assets-often 
precisely because of their "public" value-the Lucas case may in- 
deed amount to a rather appreciable restructuring of governmen- 
tal authority, a significant transfer of environmental policy- 
making power from the elected legislatures to the courts. A sub- 
stantial new inroad has been created to reduce the power of legis- 
latures to protect the natural environment on which we all 
depend. 
105. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1031 n.18. 
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